Saturday, February 26, 2005

More Lab Security Gaps Found; LANL Audit Cites Weaknesses in Handling Exiting Workers

Saturday, February 26, 2005

More Lab Security Gaps Found; LANL Audit Cites Weaknesses in Handling Exiting Workers

By Adam Rankin
Journal Staff Writer

An audit released Friday criticized Los Alamos National Laboratory for its handling of workers and scientists leaving the employment of the weapons lab.
The report, issued by the Department of Energy's Office of the Inspector General, "found no assurance that, prior to departure, LANL terminating employees turned in security badges," completed security out-processing or had their clearances and access authorizations to classified materials terminated in a timely manner.
For example, the audit notes that, of 96 employees with security clearances leaving LANL over a two-year period, 44 had not turned in their badges at the time of the audit review, 61 had not completed security out-processing paper work and 21 retained their clearances from 11 to 567 days after their departure.
LANL spokesman James Rickman contested the tone of the audit, arguing that the laboratory discovered the failings on its own in 2003 and had already implemented corrections before the audit was started.
"In fact, the laboratory already was developing new out-processing procedures at the time of the IG investigation, and these new procedures were implemented in September 2004 and have had a 99 percent success rate so far," he said.
He said the rate is expected to reach 100 percent when paperwork and reviews are included from previous quarters.
"It is important to point out that the IG investigators and laboratory inventories did not find a single instance in which property or classified material at Los Alamos was handled inappropriately as a result of out-processing weaknesses," Rickman said.
He said LANL was diligent and conscientious in its efforts to fix weaknesses lab officials had uncovered themselves prior to the audit.

Copyright 2005 Albuquerque Journal


Comments:
Inspectors General are supposed to be in search of the truth independent of their organizational leadership. The DOE IGs more often than not come in to "create the truth" out of their preconceptions or even worse the preconceptions of their overlords. Believe it or not, unlike every other IG system in the Federal Government, the DOE IG has no mechanism in place to provide a laudatory evaluation if they find something that is being managed or executed exceedingly well.

The DOE IG should not be spending their time chasing meaningless canards like the prudent retention of clearances of retirees until managers are sure than the work classified work the retirees left has been adequately transferred to someone else.
 
That's right on! The IG should be looking into issues raised in this blog.
 
A badge by itself does nothing; to use it for entry one also needs to be in the current security badge reader data base. Recall that the Director Himself was refused entry for a training lapse. How come the LANL PR squad cannot even manage to point this out in rebuttal to the IG and the media?
 
A badge by itself does nothing; to use it for entry one also needs to be in the current security badge reader data base. Recall that the Director Himself was refused entry for a training lapse. How come the LANL PR squad cannot even manage to point this out in rebuttal to the IG and the media?
 
It was not denying the Director entry because his training had expired that was the problem. The guards did what they were supposed to do. The problem was that Nanos flew into a rage and chewed out folks in the badge office and in his office for HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH TRAINING REQUIREMENTS.
 
seems like i remember you could go around to the kentucky fried chicken gate and avoid a palm reader and get in one more time to do your on line training and get un-blacklisted. guess nanos didn't know that
 
I heard the story about Nanos' rage at the badge office personnel after he was refused entry to the AD Building because he had neglected to take his annual security refresher training. This happened before the CREM "incident". I thought at the time that if I had done this I would have been immediately fired. Somehow the IG missed this.
 
Recall too his proud boasting during one of his lab-wide talks of how he took the CREM on-line training during the wee hours of the morning before he gave us the talk on how we needed to rigorously comply with lab training requirements.

We looked up his training record the week before this event, and noted he hadn't done his training as we were all expected to.

What a hypocrite! He bashes LANL employees repeatedly for failures he commits with regularity. It's good to be king!
 
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